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umans tend to see themselves as fair and honest1,2, and
often behave accordingly. Yet some are tempted to stray
from such ideals when they can get away with it3–5. This
suggests that, at least in some cases, people prioritize appearing
moral to themselves and others over truly aligning their actions
with moral principles5–7. This seems to be an effective strategy as
well. Maintaining a positive moral self-image not only bolsters
psychological well-being and physical health8–10, but also yields
downstream social benefits. Individuals who appear committed to
moral rules are viewed as more attractive social partners11,12—
and one dependable strategy for convincing others of one’s
morality is to first convince oneself of it13,14.
How can people preserve their moral self-image while simul-
taneously behaving selfishly? Social scientists have often credited
our ability to engage in motivated reasoning15—that is, we form
self-serving beliefs and attitudes to justify immoral acts to our-
selves before or after the events unfold7,16. This feat is accom-
plished in a number of ways. For one, people tend to strike a
justifiable balance between self-interest and their moral values—
for instance, lying just enough to profit financially, but not so
much as to harm their moral self-image7. In addition, people
psychologically distance themselves from their unethical actions
—attributing past misdeeds to situational pressures17, or having
been a “different person” at the time18,19. Moreover, people
exploit uncertainty—behaving more selfishly when the con-
sequences for others are ambiguous20, making self-serving mis-
takes21, and avoiding information about how their actions may
have harmed others6,22,23. A common thread in each of these self-
serving strategies is that they operate over abstract beliefs and
attitudes.
Another possibility that has received less attention is that our
desire to believe we are moral may distort memories of our
concrete experiences. When people’s actions fall short of their
personal standards, they might misremember having acted in line
with those standards. Misremembering past immoral behavior as
moral would pre-empt the need to rationalize one’s actions, as
actions that fall short of one’s personal standards would instead
be revised in memory. This possibility coheres with evidence that
people are able to “suppress” awareness of unwanted memories at
both encoding and retrieval24. It is also consistent with recent
evidence that memories for dishonest behavior (e.g., cheating) are
less subjectively vivid than memories of honest actions25, and that
memories are less accurate when recounting relevant moral rules
after cheating26,27, relevant story details after hypothetical acts of
cheating (Kouchaki and Gino25, but see also Stanley et al.28), and
selfish relative to altruistic behavior29. However, it remains an
open question whether people who violate their own moral
standards actually misremember their behavior in a self-serving
direction. Importantly, impaired vividness or accuracy (e.g., fuzzy
recollection of the moment you tipped a barista yesterday) does
not necessarily imply memory distortion (e.g., misremembering
tipping the barista more than you actually did), and vice-
versa18,30,31. This leaves open the question of whether memory
distortion may serve as another mechanism through which
individuals can act selfishly and ultimately still feel moral. When
behaving unfairly (e.g., giving a stingy tip), people may mis-
remember behaving more fairly than they actually were, thus
preserving the view that they treat others equitably.
Here, we test this possibility by leveraging experiments in
which motivated reasoning should have a minimal influence—
recalling a recently performed action for which one’s standard of
fairness is explicitly declared. If one engages in motivated rea-
soning before or after engaging in unethical behavior, there
should be no reason to misremember a justified action. If people
instead tend to engage in motivated misremembering, such biases
should be evident at recall.
Another key focus of this work concerns whether mis-
remembering is in fact motivated. A rich, long-standing debate in
social psychology concerns whether self-serving biases require
motivation32,33. For instance, many seemingly ‘motivated’ social
comparative biases (e.g., above-average effects) can arise from
rational inference processes33,34. Although the moral domain is
one where motivated effects are well-supported7,35, it is none-
theless crucial to rule out the possibility that rational inference
processes may produce misremembering that only seems morally
motivated. For instance, since people tend to be fair across many
social situations, it is reasonable for them to infer they behaved
fairly in the past. Thus, if memory for recent behavior is weak or
incomplete, people may tend to rely on knowledge of what they
normally do to inform recall.
We predicted that motivated misremembering would be spe-
cific to fairness “violators”, as we posited that this process serves
chiefly to reduce discomfort when an individual’s actions threaten
their moral self-image36,37. By focusing on personal standards of
fairness in four of our experiments, we accounted for an
important feature of social decision-making: even when people’s
overt behavior appears self-serving, people may not subjectively
perceive their behavior as selfish38. Crucially, here, we measured
each individual’s subjective threshold for what counts as a fair
(versus selfish) choice, and examined how this subjective
threshold shapes motivated misremembering of past social
choices.
In line with the predictions above, across two lab experiments
(Experiments 1 and 2) and three online experiments (Experi-
ments 3, 4a, and 4b), we find evidence that selfish decisions are
more generous in hindsight. After deciding how to split money
with anonymous partners, people tend to recall being more
generous in the past than they actually were. Crucially, this
misremembering effect occurs chiefly among people who initially
give less than what they personally believe is fair (Experiments 2,
3, 4a, and 4b). Moreover, this effect disappears under conditions
where fairness violations no longer pose a self-threat (Experiment
4b)—supporting the view that this misremembering effect is
motivated. Together, these findings suggest that when people
perceive their own actions as selfish, they are motivated to mis-
remember having acted more equitably, thereby preserving their
moral self-image.
Results
Misremembering stingy behavior. In all experiments, partici-
pants made a series of five decisions, in which they chose how to
allocate money between themselves and a unique anonymous
partner. Later, in a surprise memory test, we asked participants to
report how much they remembered giving on average across their
five decisions, and financially incentivized them to be accurate. In
Experiment 1, we predicted that participants would misremember
being more generous than they actually were, and that this effect
would be driven by relatively stingy participants (since generous
participants should have no reason to misremember their gen-
erosity). To test this hypothesis, we examined the direction of
participants’ memory errors (i.e., discrepancies between recalled
generosity and actual generosity). If our hypothesis is correct,
then memory errors should tend to be self-serving: that is,
recalled generosity should on average be greater than actual
generosity.
Across all five experiments, memory errors were non-normally
distributed (W= 0.53-78, p < 0.001; Shapiro–Wilk test), thus we
report non-parametric statistics for all key comparisons. All
reported p-values are two-tailed.
In line with our predictions, in Experiment 1, we found that
participants overall showed a systematic bias toward self-serving
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memory errors, such that recalled generosity was significantly
greater than actual generosity (V= 1345.5, p= 0.021, d= 0.23,
Cliff’s δ= 0.14; Wilcoxon signed-rank test; means and standard
deviations are reported in Supplementary Table 1).
Since we predicted that misremembering would occur chiefly
among more stingy participants, we performed a median split
based on participants’ average level of generosity across their five
decisions, dividing them into a behaviorally stingy group (N=
53) and a behaviorally generous group (N= 56). As predicted,
more stingy participants showed a bias toward self-serving
memory errors, such that they remembered giving significantly
more than they actually did (V= 335.5, p= 0.003, d= 0.34, δ=
0.23; Wilcoxon signed-rank test; Fig. 1a), whereas more generous
participants showed no such difference (V= 353, p= 0.54, d=
0.13, δ= 0.05; Wilcoxon signed-rank test). However, stingy
participants and generous participants did not significantly differ
in the extent of their self-serving memory errors (W= 1292.5,
p= 0.23, d= 0.19, δ= 0.13; Mann–Whitney U test).
Misremembering depends on violating personal standards.
Experiment 1 showed that more stingy individuals recall being
more generous than they truly were, while more generous indi-
viduals recall their choices accurately. However, the extent of
misremembering did not significantly differ between these
groups. One possibility is that by only measuring overt behavior,
we failed to capture the extent to which people’s choices truly
upheld, versus violated, their personal standards of fairness for
the situation. If misremembering is primarily driven by a desire to
reduce threats to one’s moral self-image, self-serving memory
errors should occur chiefly when people’s actions fall short of
their own personal standards, independent of how objectively
high or low those standards may be.
In Experiments 2 and 3, we tested this possibility by explicitly
probing participants’ subjective beliefs about what would count as
a fair amount to give, before they made their decisions. We
predicted that, independent of how much participants actually
gave, misremembering would occur specifically among those
participants whose true generosity fell short of what they
personally believed was fair.
In addition, we tested whether this effect persists when we
introduce a stronger incentive to be accurate. In Experiments 1
and 2, accurate recall was incentivized with a fixed bonus, such
that participants received a bonus if their recalled generosity was
within 10% of their true average. To up the stakes, in Experiment
3, we offered a monetary bonus that scaled directly with accuracy,
such that even a 1% deviation in recalled generosity would reduce
the participant’s bonus.
Across Experiments 2 and 3, participants again showed a
systematic bias towards self-serving memory errors, such that
their recalled generosity was significantly greater than their actual
generosity (Vexp.2= 4450, p= 0.003, d= 0.21, δ= 0.11; Vexp.3=
7990.5, p= 0.008, d= 0.13, δ= 0.05; Wilcoxon signed-rank tests,
see Supplementary Table 1).
To test whether this effect is driven by violating one’s personal
standards, we separately assessed memory errors in participants
who (on average) gave less than what they indicated was fair
(violators; Nexp.2= 69; Nexp.3= 143), versus those who (on
average) gave at least as much as what they indicated was fair
(upholders, Nexp.2= 165; Nexp.3= 461). As predicted, violators

































































Fig. 1 Self-serving memory errors. Differences between the mean percent participants recalled giving, versus how much they actually gave. Positive values
reflect “self-serving” memory errors. a In Experiment 1, relatively stingy-behaving participants recalled being more generous than they actually were, but
not generous-behaving participants. b In Experiment 2, we show that specifically individuals who violate their own personal standard of fairness (violators)
recall being more generous than they actually were, but not those upholding their own fairness standard (upholders). In Experiment 3 (c) and Experiment
4a (d), we replicate the finding that violators, but not upholders, recall being more generous than they truly were. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals (CIs).
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(Vexp.2= 1396.5, p < 0.001, d= 0.54, δ= 0.38; Vexp.3= 1558.5,
p < 0.001, d= 0.30, δ= 0.15; Wilcoxon signed-rank tests; Fig. 1b,
c), but this was not the case for upholders (Vexp.2= 838, p= 0.89,
d= 0.02, δ < 0.001; Vexp.3= 2439, p= 0.69, d= 0.04, δ= 0.01;
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). In addition, when comparing the
two groups directly, violators showed a significantly greater bias
toward self-serving memory errors (Wexp.2= 3710, p < 0.001, d=
0.68, δ= 0.35; Wexp.3= 28390.5, p= 0.001, d= 0.43, δ= 0.14;
Mann–Whitney U tests).
To confirm that misremembering is driven primarily by
violating one’s personal standard of fairness, rather than their
overt level of giving, we next assessed whether participants’
objective level of generosity would still show an influence on
memory when excluding violators from analyses. In other words,
does misremembering occur among those who give objectively
lower amounts, but do not violate their own fairness standard?
To test this, we performed a median split on the generosity of
only upholders, dividing them into a behaviorally stingy group
(Nexp.2= 82; Nexp.3= 230) and a behaviorally generous group
(Nexp.2= 83; Nexp.3= 231; see Supplementary Table 2).
In support of our hypothesis that violating one’s personal
standards drives misremembering, we found no evidence of a bias
toward self-serving memory errors in either behaviorally stingy
upholders (Vexp.2= 112, p= 0.51, d= 0.07, δ= 0.04; Vexp.3=
1476.5, p= 0.11, d= 0.14, δ= 0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests),
nor behaviorally generous upholders (Vexp.2= 332.5, p= 0.42,
d= 0.02, δ=−0.04; Vexp.3= 122.5, p= 0.11, d= 0.10, δ=−0.02;
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). Moreover, we found no difference
between behaviorally stingy versus generous upholders in their
tendency to make self-serving memory errors (Wexp.2= 3179,
p= 0.39, d= 0.09, δ= 0.07; Wexp.3= 24742.5, p= 0.073, d=
0.24, δ= 0.07; Mann–Whitney U tests).
These results provide initial support for the idea that personal
standards can influence how people remember their generosity. If
this is the case, then recalled generosity should be accounted for
not just by actual generosity, but also by the extent to which
actual generosity deviates from personal standards. To formally
test this possibility, we compared a model predicting recalled
generosity from actual generosity, with one predicting recalled
generosity from both actual generosity and the deviation between
actual generosity and personal standards. Importantly, we
controlled for four other predictors of memory in each model:
choice speed (the average time participants took to make their
choices), choice variance (the standard deviation of their choices),
non-giving (whether or not they ever gave a positive amount
across their choices), and numeracy (their performance on a
numeracy task between making and recalling their choices). As
predicted, we found that the model which additionally included
fairness deviations accounted for recalled generosity better than
the simpler model that did not include fairness deviations as a
predictor (ΔAICexp.2= 11.47, ΔBIC= 8.02, χ2 (1)= 13.47, p <
0.001; ΔAICexp.3= 6.33, ΔBIC= 1.92, χ2(1) = 8.33, p= 0.004;
likelihood-ratio tests; Supplementary Tables 5 and 6).
Misremembering as a motivated phenomenon. Next, we sought
evidence that the misremembering we observe here is in fact
motivated (i.e., driven by a desire to preserve one’s moral self-
image) rather than based on a rational inference (i.e., recon-
structed from past behavior based on an inference from their
fairness beliefs). If participants, when faced with difficulty recal-
ling their true choices, simply reconstruct those choices based on
an inference from what they believe is fair, we would predict that
those who gave less than their personal standard (i.e., violators)
would tend to recall giving more than they actually did, while
those who gave more than their personal standard (i.e., exceeders)
would tend to recall giving less than they actually did. However, if
misremembering is in fact motivated, we would only expect
misremembering to occur among violators, whereas exceeders
should tend to recall their choices accurately. To test these pos-
sibilities, across Experiments 2 and 3, we examined memory
errors in exceeders (Nexp.2= 69; Nexp.3= 207; see Supplementary
Table 2)—a group that showed a similar degree of norm deviation
and choice variance as violators (see Supplementary Results). In
support of our hypothesis that misremembering is motivated, we
found no evidence of misremembering toward the norm in
exceeders (Vexp.2= 587.5, p= 0.48, d < 0.001, δ=−0.04; Vexp.3=
1704.5, p= 0.99, d= 0.04, δ= 0.01; Wilcoxon signed-rank tests),
and violators misremembered to a significantly greater degree
than exceeders (Wexp.2= 1537, p < 0.001, d= 0.57, δ= 0.35;
Wexp.3= 12767.5, p= 0.015, d= 0.31, δ= 0.14; Mann–Whitney
U tests).
Nevertheless, even if exceeders show no bias on average, a
rational inference account would still find partial support if
exceeders were more likely to make errors in the direction of their
norm (i.e., norm-directed memory errors) than in the opposite
direction. To address this question, we compared the frequency of
errors made in each direction by exceeders and violators. For this
analysis, we were limited to a smaller sample as we were only able
to analyze data from those violators (Nexp.2= 58; Nexp.3= 64) and
exceeders (Nexp.2= 51; Nexp.3= 82) who in fact made memory
errors. A binomial test indicated that, whereas the proportion of
violators who made norm-directed memory errors was greater
than chance (pexp.2 < 0.001, 95% CI [0.59, 0.83]; pexp.3= 0.008,
95% CI [0.54, 0.78]), the proportion of exceeders who made
norm-directed memory errors was no different than that expected
by chance (pexp.2= 0.78, 95% CI [0.33, 0.62]; pexp.3= 0.91, 95% CI
[0.40, 0.62])). These results are inconsistent with a rational
inference account, but consistent with a motivated account of
misremembering.
Motive-dependence and choice-independence. The findings of
Experiments 2 and 3 cohere with the possibility that the memory
bias we observe is a motivated phenomenon. However, they only
demonstrate this phenomenon indirectly. A motivated account of
misremembering would receive compelling evidence over a
rational inference account with direct evidence for two key
conditions.
First, motivated misremembering should be motive-dependent.
That is, misremembering should occur only when people have a
motive to misremember, and should cease to occur if motives to
misremember are removed. In particular, a rich, long-standing
literature on motivated cognition suggests that when people no
longer view themselves as personally responsible for a
dissonance-inducing action, they no longer experience dissonance
motivation39–42. Indeed, feelings of responsibility for an action
serve as a bridge between the action and one’s self-concept43. As
such, only if people feel personally responsible for their fairness
violation should they experience a moral self-threat, and become
motivated to reduce it via misremembering.
Second, motivated misremembering should be largely choice-
independent. That is, it should be independent of any
peculiarities of the choices that violators and upholders tend to
make. Indeed, one possible alternative explanation for our
findings is that there is something about the pattern of violators’
choices that makes their choices more prone to being mis-
remembered—for instance, that the amount they gave across their
choices varied more. Thus, it is important to rule out the
possibility that the sets of choices made by violators are just
inherently more prone to being misremembered than the sets of
choices made by upholders.
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In a final pair of experiments (Experiments 4a and b), we
examined these two hypotheses to directly test the motivated
nature of misremembering. In Experiment 4a, an initial wave of
participants (free-choice deciders) freely decided how to split
money with anonymous partners, and later recalled their choices
(as in prior experiments). Next, in Experiment 4b, a second wave
of participants (forced-choice deciders) were each yoked to a
randomly selected free-choice decider from Experiment 4a, and
were forced to make (and later recall) the exact same set of
transfer choices as their yoked free-choice decider (See Fig. 2a).
Crucially, in Experiment 4b, forced-choice deciders (as well as the
recipients of their transfers) were instructed that the decider had
no responsibility for their transfer choices—thereby removing any
incentive to misremember their choices. Moreover, we confirmed
that feelings of personal responsibility were lower among forced-
choice (versus free-choice) deciders (See Fig. 2b, c for distribu-
tions of reported personal responsibility).
We made the following key predictions. Based on the motive-
dependence hypothesis, we predicted that those who freely violated
their own standards would make self-serving memory errors,
whereas those who were forced to violate their own standards and
perceived no personal responsibility for their actions would show
no such bias toward self-serving memory errors.
Similarly, based on the choice-independence hypothesis, we
predicted that while violators in the free-choice condition would
make self-serving memory errors, their yoked counterparts in the
forced-choice condition, who had to recall exactly the same
choices, would not make such errors.
Since Experiment 4a was structured the same as Experiments 2
and 3, we first conducted all key tests that were reported in
Experiments 2 and 3. We replicated all of the key results reported
above (see Supplementary Results).
Misremembering is motive-dependent. To evaluate the efficacy
of our manipulation, we first assessed how responsible partici-
pants perceived themselves to be for their actions under free-
choice (Experiment 4a) and forced-choice (Experiment 4b)
conditions. As predicted, free-choice participants reported a high
degree of responsibility for their actions (M= 6.28, SD= 1.18),
with 64% (N= 452/709) reporting the highest level of responsi-
bility possible for their actions (7= “Extremely responsible”;
Fig. 2b). In contrast, forced-choice participants reported a low
degree of responsibility for their actions (M= 2.14, SD= 2.03),
with 70% (N= 408/580) reporting the lowest level of responsi-
bility possible for their actions (1= “Not at all responsible”;
Fig. 2c). The difference in ratings between these two groups was
significant (W= 375501.5, p < 0.001, d= 2.56, δ= 0.83;
Mann–Whitney U test). Nevertheless, some participants in the
forced-choice condition indicated they felt some degree of
responsibility for their choices despite not making them freely.
This is plausible in the context of our experiments because par-
ticipants ultimately had to still move the slider to register the
predetermined choice.
We predicted that while those who freely violated their own
standards would make self-serving memory errors, those who
were forced to violate their standards (and consequently
perceived no personal responsibility for their actions) should
show no such bias toward self-serving memory errors.
Consistent with our prior experiments, in Experiment 4a, free-
choice participants showed a systematic bias toward self-serving
memory errors (V= 29581, p < 0.001, d= 0.18, δ= 0.08; Wil-
coxon ranked-sum test). Violators (N= 231) recalled being more
generous than they actually were (V= 8609.5, p < 0.001, d= 0.40,
δ= 0.26; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test; see Fig. 1d), but upholders
(N= 478) showed no such bias (V= 6102.5, p= 0.92, d= 0.02,
δ=−0.01; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test). Furthermore, violators
showed a greater bias toward self-serving memory errors
than upholders (W= 42117, p < 0.001, d= 0.43, δ= 0.24;
Mann–Whitney U test).
By contrast, in Experiment 4b, forced-choice participants did
not show a significant bias toward self-serving memory errors
(V= 16087.5, p= 0.16, d= 0.11, δ= 0.05, Wilcoxon ranked-sum
test; Supplementary Table 1). Further analyses revealed that
similar to free-choice upholders, forced-choice upholders (N=
362) did not exhibit self-serving memory errors (V= 3393, p=
0.14, d= 0.02, δ=−0.02; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test). Forced-
choice violators (N= 217)—despite not freely choosing to violate
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Round 1: What % would you
like to transfer to Participant 2?
40%
1000
Round 1: Please move the slider
to transfer 40% to Participant 2
Fig. 2 Manipulation of responsibility in Experiments 4a and b. The top panel (a) shows an example of a yoked pair of deciders making a free-choice
transfer (Experiment 4a) and a forced-choice transfer (Experiment 4b). The amount (and order) of each of the five transfer choices were identical for
yoked deciders. The bottom panel shows self-reported personal responsibility from 1 (“Not at all responsible”) to 7 (“Extremely responsible”) among
deciders in Experiments 4a (free-choice; b) and Experiment 4b (forced-choice; c).
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their norm—nevertheless did recall on average being more
generous than they actually were (V= 4580.5, p < 0.001; d= 0.28,
δ= 0.15, Wilcoxon ranked-sum test, Fig 3a). However, the
magnitude of misremembering was smaller in forced-choice
violators (d= 0.28, δ= 0.15) than free-choice violators (d= 0.40,
δ= 0.26). We also found that forced-choice violators showed a
greater bias toward self-serving memory errors than upholders
(W= 33105.5, p < 0.001, d= 0.34, δ= 0.16, Mann–Whitney U
test), though again this effect was smaller than the difference
between free-choice violators and upholders in Experiment 4a
(d= 0.43, δ= 0.24).
Thus, while our forced-choice manipulation eliminated the
main effect of misremembering, there remained a significant,
albeit diminished, misremembering effect for forced-choice
violators. One possibility is that, despite our instructions that
sought to minimize feelings of responsibility in the forced-choice
experiment, some forced-choice violators may have still felt some
degree of personal responsibility, and thus were motivated to
misremember. This prediction follows from work showing that
while following orders or instructions can reduce feelings of
responsibility, it does not eliminate them entirely (e.g., refs. 40,44).
Supporting our prediction, ~30% of forced-choice participants
reported feeling some degree of responsibility for their choices.
Crucially, the motive-dependence hypothesis predicts that the
forced-choice manipulation should eliminate motivated misre-
membering only in those violators who viewed themselves as not
personally responsible for their actions, whereas forced-choice
violators who viewed themselves as personally responsible should
remain motivated to make self-serving memory errors. To test
this possibility, we independently assessed the memories of those
who reported being “not at all responsible” for their actions (i.e., 1
out of 7 on our personal responsibility measure; N= 408), and
those who self-reported some degree of personal responsibility for
their actions (i.e., greater than 1 out of 7 on our personal
responsibility measure; M= 4.87, SD= 1.84; N= 171).
Consistent with the motive-dependence hypothesis, forced-
choice deciders who nonetheless perceived themselves as
responsible for their actions showed a significant bias toward
self-serving memory errors (V= 3206.5, p= 0.019, d= 0.20, δ=
0.14; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test; Supplementary Table 1). More
specifically, violators (N= 79) showed a significant bias toward
self-serving memory errors (V= 1258.5, p < 0.001, d= 0.50, δ=
0.46; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test; Fig. 3c), whereas upholders
(N= 92) showed no such bias (V= 372, p= 0.066, d= 0.08, δ=
−0.13; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test). We also found that
violators showed a greater bias toward self-serving memory
errors than upholders (W= 2010, p < 0.001, d= 0.61, δ= 0.45;
Mann–Whitney U test).
In contrast, forced-choice participants who reported feeling no
responsibility for their actions showed no bias toward self-serving
memory errors (V= 4802.5, p= 0.68, d= 0.03, δ= 0.01; Wil-
coxon ranked-sum test; Supplementary Table 1). In particular,
neither violators in this group of participants (N= 138; V= 874,
p= 0.61, d= 0.05, δ=−0.02; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test; Fig. 3b)
nor upholders (N= 270; V= 1600.5, p= 0.93, d= 0.03, δ= 0.02,
Wilcoxon ranked-sum test) showed any bias toward self-serving
memory errors. Moreover, violators and upholders did not differ
in the extent of their self-serving memory errors (W= 19171.5,
p= 0.57, d= 0.01, δ= 0.03; Mann–Whitney U test).
Crucially, forced-choice violators who felt responsible reported
significantly larger self-serving memory errors than forced-choice
violators who did not feel responsible (W= 3222, p < 0.001, d=
0.60, δ= 0.41; Mann–Whitney U test). Moreover, free-choice
violators in Experiment 4a made significantly larger self-serving
memory errors than forced-choice violators in Experiment 4b
who did not feel responsible (W= 19925.5, p < 0.001, d= 0.44,
δ= 0.25; Mann–Whitney U test).
Misremembering is choice-independent. We also predicted that
while those who freely violate their own standards should tend to
make self-serving memory errors, those forced to make the same
choices would show no bias toward self-serving memory errors—
regardless of whether those choices violated their own standards
or not. To test this, we directly compared the recall performance
of 579 matched pairs of free-choice deciders and forced-choice
deciders.
When we examined the subset of Experiment 4a free-choice
deciders who were yoked with Experiment 4b forced-choice
deciders (N= 579), we again observed a systematic bias toward
self-serving memory errors in free-choice deciders (V= 19876,
p < 0.001, d= 0.19, δ= 0.09; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test; Supple-
mentary Table 1). In particular, violators (N= 181) recalled being
more generous than they actually were (V= 5627.5, p < 0.001,
d= 0.42, δ= 0.26; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test; Fig. 4a), whereas
upholders (N= 398) showed no such bias (V= 4255.5, p= 0.53,
d= 0.04, δ= 0.01; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test). We also found
that violators showed a greater bias toward self-serving memory
errors than upholders (W= 27721.5, p < 0.001, d= 0.44, δ= 0.23;
Mann–Whitney U test).
In contrast, yoked forced-choice deciders—who were forced to








































Fig. 3 Motive-dependence of self-serving memory errors. a In Experiment 4b, forced-choice violators exhibited more self-serving memory errors than
forced-choice upholders. But crucially, this effect depends on whether violators felt responsible for their fairness violations. b Forced-choice violators who
perceived no responsibility for their actions showed no self-serving memory errors. c In contrast, forced-choice violators who nonetheless still perceived
themselves as responsible for their actions exhibited self-serving memory errors. Error bars represent 95% CIs.
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choice deciders—showed no significant bias toward self-serving
memory errors (V= 16087.5, p= 0.16, d= 0.11, δ= 0.05;
Wilcoxon ranked-sum test; Supplementary Table 1). Indeed,
neither those forced to make and then recall the same choices as
violators (N= 181; V= 1773.5, p= 0.17, d= 0.11, δ= 0.12;
Wilcoxon ranked-sum test) nor upholders (N= 398, V=
7149.5, p= 0.53, d= 0.11, δ= 0.02; Wilcoxon ranked-sum test)
showed self-serving memory errors (Fig. 4b). While those paired
with violators tended to have less accurate memories in general
(W= 23396.5, p < 0.001, d= 0.43, δ= 0.35; Mann–Whitney U
test), memory inaccuracy in forced-choice violators did not
predict self-serving memories in yoked free-choice violators (see
Supplementary Results). Moreover, crucially, we found no
difference in the extent to which yoked forced-choice deciders
paired with violators (versus upholders) made self-serving
memory errors (W= 33476, p= 0.13, d= 0.04, δ= 0.07;
Mann–Whitney U test).
Discussion
In The Descent of Man, Darwin wrote “A moral being is one who
is capable of reflecting on his past actions and their motives—of
approving of some and disapproving of others”45. Here we offer
one account of how people may fall short of Darwin’s moral
criterion. Across five experiments, we found that people tend to
recall being more generous than they actually were. This occurred
even when participants could receive a monetary bonus that
directly scaled with their memory accuracy. Crucially, this effect
was driven by a subset of individuals whose generosity fell short
of what they personally believed was fair, independent of their
absolute level of giving. Such individuals not only showed more
self-serving memory errors, but were also less confident in their
memories compared to individuals who upheld their personal
fairness standards. Further analyses revealed that this phenom-
enon is in fact motivated, as opposed to arising from rational
inference processes. Specifically, misremembering only occurred
when violating fairness standards posed a self-threat—i.e., when
people perceived themselves as personally responsible for their
actions. Together, our findings highlight the importance of
assessing selfishness as it is perceived by social decision-makers—
that is, relative to their own, subjective moral beliefs. More cru-
cially, these findings contribute to a growing literature on the
motivated nature of memory25–29,46–48 by supporting the idea
that people can misremember not just rules, or hypothetical
situations, but also concrete actions.
Specifically, these findings suggest that those who violate (as
opposed to uphold) their personal standards misremember the
extent of their selfishness. Moreover, they highlight the key
motivational role of perceived responsibility for norm violations
—consistent with classic accounts from social psychology42, and
recent evidence from experimental economics29. However, since
we focused specifically on those who reported no responsibility, it
is also conceivable that other factors might have differed between
the participants who felt responsible and those who did not.
We interpret these results as evidence of motivated memory
distortion, however, an alternative account would hold that these
individuals were aware of their true level of generosity at recall,
yet were willing to pay a cost to claim having been more gener-
ous. While this account is not inconsistent with prior work7, it
should be less likely in a context which is anonymous, involves no
future interaction with any partners, and requires memories to be
verified by an experimenter49. Accordingly, we found little to no
effect of trait social desirability on peoples’ reported memories.
Together, these points suggest that people were actually mis-
remembering their choices, rather than consciously lying
about them.
A related literature suggests that memory is enhanced for
emotional events50—and violating fairness standards may
immediately induce negative emotions such as guilt51,52. From
this literature, one would expect fairness violations to be more
memorable than morally-consistent choices28. This may be
especially true of extreme moral transgressions (e.g., physical
harm), which may remain memorable to transgressors long after
they occurred53, or when one’s moral transgression was witnessed
by others—which could elicit social emotions such as shame or
embarrassment54. Such contexts may indeed elicit a different self-
serving strategy. If one’s moral conduct were witnessed by, or
directly comparable to, the conduct of one’s peers, individuals
might instead distort their moral view of others (e.g., viewing
peers as being less moral than they truly are46,55). Crucially, here
we focused on relatively minor fairness violations, which occurred
anonymously. As such, we anticipated that the intensity of
negative emotion experienced by agents would not be strong
enough to elicit preferential encoding of their own actions—a
prediction supported by the presence of self-serving memory
errors across our five experiments. Ultimately, uncovering how
memory for selfishness shifts as a function of (i) the degree of
harm caused by the choice and (ii) the presence of others remain
exciting and important directions for future work to explore.
If we accept the possibility that people can misremember their
misdeeds, what cognitive and neural mechanisms might facilitate
this effect? Motivated misremembering could plausibly emerge at



































Fig. 4 Choice-independence of self-serving memory errors. a In Experiment 4a, free-choice violators exhibited self-serving memory errors. b In contrast,
in Experiment 4b, participants forced to make identical choices as violators exhibited no such bias toward self-serving memory errors. Error bars represent
95% CIs.
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Below we propose three possibilities, however, it is important
to note that it is plausible that numerous memory mechanisms
could contribute to misremembering in our experiments24,56,57.
One possibility is that selfish individuals misremember their
choices via mechanisms that unfold at encoding. Memory
encoding is chiefly determined by attention58, which in turn is
guided by our goals59. Upon first becoming aware of the intention
to make a selfish choice, individuals may attend less to episodic
details, and strategically downregulate the depth of processing of
such episodes via inhibitory control processes24. As a con-
sequence, violators may misremember at recall due to their most
selfish choices being less available in memory60,61—that is, selfish
choices are less richly encoded, and thus more generous choices
loom larger at recall.
Another possibility is that selfish choices are accurately stored
in memory, but later distorted via retrieval-related processes24,35.
To this end, individuals might suppress retrieving their more
selfish choices. Engaging in this form of motivated control over
memory—suppression-induced forgetting—has been shown to
not only prevent the suppressed memory from entering conscious
awareness, but also reduce its accessibility during subsequent
retrieval attempts62,63. Such findings suggest that even if selfish
and fair choices are stored with equal fidelity, selfish choices may
nonetheless become less accessible over time, leading one to
preferentially recall choices that better align with one’s moral self-
view. This raises at least one key direction for future work: since
misremembering was more likely to occur when people varied in
their choices, it could be strategic to vary the specific amount one
gives each time to facilitate motivated misremembering.
Importantly, these cognitive mechanisms of misremembering
are neurally dissociable24,64,65. For instance, an encoding account
of misremembering would be more consistent with decreased
functional connectivity between midbrain dopaminergic targets
and hippocampus immediately following selfish choices64. In
contrast, a retrieval account of misremembering would predict
increased dorsolateral prefrontal activation and reduced hippo-
campal activation beyond the encoding phase, reflecting retrieval-
related top-down control over memory62,66. Teasing apart the
influences of such mechanisms may be fruitfully pursued by
examining how neural representations of ethical and unethical
memories change over time67. Such work could allow for a deeper
understanding of the mechanisms by which memory operates in
the service of one’s goals, and specifically, how the malleability of
memory helps us maintain ethically spotless minds.
Methods
Experiments 1 and 2: lab participants. In all, 112 participants (57 female, 50
male, 5 did not specify; mean age= 22.0), completed Experiment 1, and 243
participants (118 female, 125 male; mean age= 22.8) completed Experiment 2,
respectively. In both experiments, participants were recruited from the University
of Zürich participant database. We focused our recruitment on individuals who
had not previously participated in experiments involving dictator games. Though,
due to an administrative oversight in Experiment 2, there were five participants
who did not meet this criterion but nonetheless participated in the experiment,
which was discovered after data collection. These five participants were excluded
from further analysis.
In Experiment 1, three participants were excluded for being extreme outliers
(i.e., >4 standard deviations from the mean) in the size of their memory errors—
our key dependent measure. This left a total sample of 109 participants. In
Experiment 2, four participants were excluded for being extreme outliers (i.e.,
>4 standard deviations from the mean) in the size of their memory errors,
leaving a total sample of 234 participants. To test the robustness of our results,
we confirmed that our findings remained consistent when we additionally
exclude subjects who never chose to give money in our task (Nexp.1= 18;
Nexp.2= 51), as well as when we include all participants in our analyses (see
Supplementary Results). The University of Zurich Ethics Commission approved
the procedures in Experiments 1 and 2. Both experiments complied with all
relevant ethical regulations for work with human participants and all
participants provided written informed consent.
Experiments 1 and 2: lab procedures. Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted in the
Experimental Laboratory at the Department of Economics, University of Zurich. In
Experiment 1, data were collected across five experimental sessions, with the
number of participants per session ranging from 11 to 30. In Experiment 2, data
were collected across 13 experimental sessions, with the number of participants
per session ranging from 10 to 31. Participants provided informed consent and
then received instructions for the experiment. They were instructed that their
responses would remain confidential and anonymous and that they would receive a
payment of CHF 10 for participation in the experiment, as well as an additional
payment based on one of their choices during the experiment, which they would
receive in cash at the end of the session.
In both experiments, participants were instructed that they would be playing a
dictator game in which they would be paired anonymously with another
participant. They were further instructed that one of the participants (Participant
1) would decide how to divide a sum of money between themselves and the other
participant (Participant 2), and were informed that their role would be revealed to
them at a later point in time.
One key difference between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 is that, at this point
in Experiment 2, we probed participants’ fairness standards by asking them to
indicate what they believed to be the “maximum acceptable share” for Participant 1
(the decider) to keep. Half of participants indicated their fairness standards before
learning they were assigned the role of Participant 1, and the other half indicated
their fairness standard after learning their role. The timing of the fairness standards
question had no influence on the results, and thus we collapsed across these
conditions in all analyses for Experiment 2 (see Supplementary Results for more
details).
In both experiments, participants were ultimately assigned to the role of
dictator (Participant 1) for a series of five modified dictator games, each with a
unique anonymous partner. As dictators, participants made choices about an
endowment that could range in size from CHF 10 to CHF 30, however its size was
unknown at the time of choice. For each of their five choices, participants had to
select what percentage of the endowment they would like to keep for themselves,
and what percentage they would transfer to the anonymous recipient, in 10%
increments ranging from [Keep 100%, Send 0%] to [Keep 0%, Send 100%]. They
were informed that one of their choices would be randomly selected and
implemented, and that the size of the endowment would also be randomly
determined and revealed at the end of the experiment. Importantly, it was
emphasized to participants that there would be no further interaction with the
recipient after making their choices.
Choices were made consecutively on separate screens (for further details on
choice format, see Supplementary Methods). After the participant selected and
confirmed their choice, the screen advanced to the next choice after a 1-s delay.
After making their five choices, participants completed demographic measures
(age, gender, and education) as well as a test of numeracy68. The numeracy test
took ~5 min, ensuring that participants’ previous dictator game choices would no
longer be in their short-term memory69.
Finally, participants were presented with a surprise incentivized memory test in
which they were asked to recall their previous choices and indicate what percent of
the endowment, on average, they transferred to the recipient. Participants were
asked to record their response on a provided answer sheet. To motivate
participants to recall their choices accurately, they were informed that they would
receive an additional CHF 5 if their response was within 10% of their actual average
transfer. This setup ensured that participants had no incentive to consciously lie. At
the recall phase, participants knew that there would be no future interactions with
any partners. They also knew that their reported memories were accessible by the
research team—who also had access to the participants true choices in order to
determine their accuracy bonus. Such knowledge is known to reduce lying49.
Experiments 3: online participants. In Experiment 3, we determined our sample
size by focusing on achieving sufficient power within our main groups of interest:
violators and upholders. For Experiment 3, a power analysis showed that a
minimum sample size of N= 128 would be needed to attain ~95% power to detect
a small to medium-sized effect (d ≈ 0.30) at an alpha level of 0.05. We predicted
that at least 25% of participants would violate their personal standard of fairness
based on Experiment 2, and thus determined that a minimum total sample size of
128 × 4= 512 participants would be needed.
In all, 647 participants (344 female, 301 male, 2 did not specify; mean age=
36.4) completed Experiment 3. All participants were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Since this experiment was conducted online, we also included a
series of comprehension checks and attention probes (including transcribing
several sentences of text, as well as two binary questions in which we asked
participants if they understood key aspects of the task). In total, 28 participants
were excluded for failing at least one of our comprehension checks. Moreover, five
participants were excluded for reporting suspicion about key aspects of the task.
Finally, 11 participants were excluded for being extreme outliers (i.e., >4 standard
deviations from the mean) in the size of their memory errors. This left a total
sample of 604 participants. Our findings remain consistent when we also exclude
subjects who never chose to give money in our task (N= 100), as well as when we
include all participants in our analyses (see Supplementary Results).
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The Yale University Human Investigation Committee approved the procedures
for Experiment 3. The experiment complied with all relevant ethical regulations for
work with human participants and all participants provided informed consent.
Experiments 3: online procedure. The experimental protocol for Experiment 3
was largely identical to Experiment 2, with a few exceptions. Like Experiments 1
and 2, choices were made consecutively on separate screens. Before each choice
screen, participants saw an intermediary screen for 3 s that said “Round # will now
begin.”
As dictators, participants made choices about an endowment that could range
in size from 10 to 30 cents. Like before, the size of this endowment was unknown at
the time of choice.
One crucial difference from prior experiments was how we incentivized the
surprise memory test: participants were informed at the test that they would receive
a scaling monetary bonus for accurately recalling their generosity, such that they
would lose 2% of their bonus for each 1% their recalled average transfer rate
deviated from their actual average transfer rate. Unlike the prior experiments,
participants were not informed of the size of this bonus until after the experiment.
In addition, all participants in this experiment made fairness judgements without
prior knowledge of whether they would be assigned as Participant 1 (the decider)
or Participant 2 (the receiver). Here, we probed fairness standards by asking
participants to report what they believed to be the minimum acceptable share for
Participant 1 (the decider) to transfer to Participant 2 (the receiver).
In Experiment 3, participants reported the percentage they recalled transferring
on a sliding scale (the “Slider” Question type and “Bars” subtype in Qualtrics).
They could report their recalled average in 1% increments on this scale.
Furthermore, we used a slightly different scale/depiction from the format in which
choices were made. Choices were made also using a similar but visually distinct
slider scale (the “Slider” question type and “Sliders” subtype in Qualtrics), and were
instead made in 10% increments.
Experiments 4a and b: online participants. In Experiment 4a and b, we deter-
mined our sample size by focusing on achieving sufficient power within our main
group of interest: violators. A minimum sample size of N= 298 (N= 149 per
group) was needed to attain ~95% power to detect the key group difference
observed in Experiment 3 (d ≈ 0.43) at an alpha level of 0.05. We predicted that at
least 25% of participants would violate their personal standard of fairness based on
our prior experiments, and thus determined a minimum total sample size of 149 ×
4= 596 participants was needed.
In total, 1152 participants (469 female, 678 male, five did not specify; mean
age= 34.2) completed Experiment 4a, and 1036 participants (571 female, 462 male,
three did not specify; mean age= 35.9) completed Experiment 4b—including an
initial 719 participants, and an additional 317 participants whose data were
collected (within 3 days of the initial data collection period) to ensure sufficient
power for paired analyses after exclusions. All participants were recruited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk.
In Experiment 4a, we excluded 266 participants who failed at least one of our
comprehension checks, as well as 163 participants who reported any suspicion
about key aspects of the task. Finally, 14 participants were excluded for being
extreme outliers (i.e., >4 standard deviations from the mean) in the size of their
memory errors. This left a total sample of 709 participants in Experiment 4a.
Importantly, our key findings remain the same when also excluding non-givers
(N= 78), as well as when including all participants in the analyses (see
Supplementary Results). The choices made by each of these 709 free-choice
participants formed the ‘choice sets’ that were subsequently provided to forced-
choice participants in Experiment 4b.
In Experiment 4b, we excluded 268 participants who failed at least one of our
comprehension checks, and 181 participants who reported suspicion about key
aspects of the task. Finally, eight participants were also excluded for being extreme
outliers (i.e., >4 standard deviations from the mean) in the size of their memory
errors. This left a total sample of 579 participants in Experiment 4b, and ultimately
579 unique yoked pairs of free-choice and forced-choice deciders—though our key
findings again remain the same when we run our analyses using all 709 unique
yoked pairs, and when excluding yoked pairs of non-givers (see Supplementary
Results). The Yale University Human Investigation Committee approved the
procedures for Experiments 4a and 4b. Both experiments complied with all
relevant ethical regulations for work with human participants and all participants
provided informed consent.
Experiments 4a and b: online procedures. The procedure of Experiment 4a was
nearly identical to Experiment 3. Participants were informed of the allocation task,
reported their fairness standard, and then made five choices about how to allocate
an endowment of money between themselves and anonymous partners. Later, they
received a surprise memory test and were paid for accuracy using the same
incentive scheme as in Experiment 3.
In Experiment 4b, participants initially received the same instructions as those
Experiment 4a—including the same details for the allocation task. This was to
ensure that they reported their fairness standard under the assumption of free-
choice (as in Experiment 4a). After reporting their fairness standard, they were
subsequently informed that they had been assigned to complete an alternate
version of the task in the role of Participant 1. Specifically, participants were
instructed that in the alternate version of the task, they would not be able to choose
what proportion of the endowment to transfer to Participant 2, and that transfer
amounts would instead be randomly predetermined. On each transfer trial,
participants used the same slider to make their transfer choices, however they were
instructed to “Please move the slider to transfer X% to Participant 2 this round”. To
advance to the next round, participants had to move the slider to the specified
amount. Crucially, the amount displayed on each of the five trials matched the
exact amount and order of transfers made by a yoked free-choice participant from
Experiment 4a. After making their allocation choices, the experiment proceeded
identically to Experiment 4a. After completing the surprise memory quiz,
participants in Experiments 4a and b completed a measure of memory confidence
(as in Experiment 3), a measure of personal responsibility, and exploratory
measures of psychological discomfort.
Memory measures: all experiments. Of central interest in all experiments was
the difference between the actual average percentage each participant gave, and
their memory of the average percentage they gave. To address this, we conducted
two complementary analyses:
We were specifically interested in whether people would remember giving more
than they actually gave—that is, if they would make self-serving memory errors.
We operationalize motivated misremembering as the occurrence of self-serving
memory errors in our task. These two terms are used interchangeably throughout
the paper. We measured this tendency by taking into account the direction of
participants’ memory errors: positive values indicated a participant recalled giving
more than they actually gave (i.e., a self-serving memory error), and negative values
indicated that they recalled giving less than they actually gave (i.e., a self-defeating
memory error).
In addition, we examined memory inaccuracy. To do so we computed the
absolute difference between participant’s actual and recalled generosity (i.e., the
absolute size of memory errors). This allowed us to assess which group tended to
make larger memory errors (independent of whether they remembered giving
more or less than they actually gave). Results for this measure are reported in the
Supplementary Information.
Control measures: all experiments. We also assessed several factors that we
predicted would impact memory inaccuracy: (i) choice speed—the average reaction
time of each participant’s five choices, (ii) choice variance—the standard deviation
of their five choices, (iii) non-giving—whether or not they ever gave a positive
amount across their five choices, and (iv) their performance on the numeracy test
described above. Our key results remain the same controlling for these factors, as
such we report analyses of these measures in the Supplementary Information (see
Supplementary Tables 3 and 4).
Since choice variance could directly impact the memorability of one’s choices,
we also confirmed that all key findings remain consistent when excluding ‘static’
deciders—that is, those participants who always made identical allocation choices
(See Supplementary Results and Discussion).
Personal responsibility: Experiment 4a and b. To assess personal responsibility
in Experiments 4a and b, we asked people how responsible they felt for the amount
of money that was transferred to the receiver on a scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all
responsible”) to 7 (“Extremely responsible”).
Internal validity of fairness standards measure: Experiments 2, 3, and 4a. To
support the validity of our measure of personal standards of fairness, we tested how
well this measure tracked with people’s actual behavior. People’s reported standard
of fairness were highly correlated with their actual behavior in Experiment 2 (rs=
0.78, p < 0.001), Experiment 3 (rs= 0.55, p < 0.001), and Experiment 4a (rs= 0.72,
p < 0.001)—suggesting that such standards reflected a meaningful guide for peo-
ple’s actual behavior (see Supplementary Text for additional analyses). Since par-
ticipants did not freely make choices in Experiment 4b, we did not test internal
validity in this experiment.
Socially desirable responding: Experiment 3. In Experiment 3, we probed par-
ticipants’ tendency to engage in socially desirable responding using a short-form
(10-item) version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale70. This measure
allowed us to rule out the possibility that motivated misremembering can be
reduced to socially desirable responding. Our results remain the same when con-
trolling for this factor (See Supplementary Table 6).
Memory confidence: Experiments 3, 4a, and 4b. After participants recalled their
average generosity, we asked them to rate how confident they were in their recalled
generosity on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all confident”) to 7
(“Extremely confident”). Spearman rank correlation tests showed that self-reported
memory confidence was negatively correlated with the size of participants’ actual
memory errors in Experiment 3 (rs=−0.64, p < 0.001), Experiment 4a (rs=−0.55,
p < 0.001), and Experiment 4b (rs=−0.57, p < 0.001).
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Psychological consequences: Experiments 3, 4a, and 4b. In Experiment 3, we
explored two factors that could shift as a function of whether an individual engaged
in motivated misremembering or not: their affective state and their moral self-view.
Moreover, in Experiments 4a and b, we explored an additional factor that could
shift as a function of whether an individual engaged in motivated misremembering
or not: psychological discomfort. For further details, see Supplementary Methods
and Results.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
Raw data for all experiments are publicly available in an Open Science Framework (OSF)
repository (osf.io/pzwt7/; [DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/PZWT7]). A reporting summary for
this Article is available as a Supplementary Information file.
Code availability
Analysis code for all experiments are also publicly available in the same OSF repository
(osf.io/pzwt7/).
Received: 21 August 2018; Accepted: 12 March 2020;
References
1. Sanitioso, R., Kunda, Z. & Fong, G. T. Motivated recruitment of
autobiographical memories. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 59, 229–241 (1990).
2. Greenwald, A. G. The totalitarian ego: fabrication and revision of personal
history. Am. Psychol. 35, 603–618 (1980).
3. DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M. & Epstein, J. A.
Lying in everyday life. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 70, 979 (1996).
4. Engel, C. Dictator games: a meta study. Exp. Econ. 14, 583–610 (2011).
5. Bénabou, R. & Tirole, J. Incentives and prosocial behavior. Am. Econ. Rev. 96,
1652–1678 (2006).
6. Dana, J., Weber, R. A. & Kuang, J. X. Exploiting moral wiggle room:
experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Econ. Theory
33, 67–80 (2007).
7. Mazar, N., Amir, O. & Ariely, D. The dishonesty of honest people: a theory of
self-concept maintenance. J. Mark. Res 45, 633–644 (2008).
8. McKay, R. T. & Dennett, D. C. Our evolving beliefs about evolved misbelief.
Behav. Brain Sci. 32, 541–561 (2009).
9. Ryan, R. M. & Deci, E. L. On happiness and human potentials: a review of
research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 52,
141–166 (2001).
10. Taylor, S. E. & Brown, J. D. Illusion and well-being: a social psychological
perspective on mental health. Psychol. Bull. 103, 193 (1988).
11. Jordan, J. J., Sommers, R., Bloom, P. & Rand, D. G. Why do we hate
hypocrites? Evidence for a theory of false signaling. Psychol. Sci. 28, 356–368
(2017).
12. Miller, G. F. Sexual selection for moral virtues. Q. Rev. Biol. 82, 97–125 (2007).
13. Smith, M. K., Trivers, R. & von Hippel, W. Self-deception facilitates
interpersonal persuasion. J. Econ. Psychol. 63, 93–101 (2017).
14. Von Hippel, W. & Trivers, R. Reflections on self-deception. Behav. Brain Sci.
34, 41–56 (2011).
15. Kunda, Z. The case for motivated reasoning. Psychol. Bull. 108, 480 (1990).
16. Shalvi, S., Gino, F., Barkan, R. & Ayal, S. Self-serving justifications: doing
wrong and feeling moral. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 24, 125–130 (2015).
17. Malle, B. F. The actor-observer asymmetry in attribution: a (surprising) meta-
analysis. Psychol. Bull. 132, 895 (2006).
18. Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., Iyengar, V., Sinnott-Armstrong, W. & De Brigard, F.
I’m not the person I used to be: the self and autobiographical memories of
immoral actions. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 146, 884 (2017).
19. Ross, M. & Wilson, A. E. Autobiographical memory and conceptions of self:
getting better all the time. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 12, 66–69 (2003).
20. Exley, C. L. Excusing selfishness in charitable giving: the role of risk. Rev.
Econ. Stud. 83, 587–628 (2015).
21. Exley, C. & Kessler, J. B. Motivated Errors. Preprint at https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3511305 (2018).
22. Feiler, L. Testing models of information avoidance with binary choice dictator
games. J. Econ. Psychol. 45, 253–267 (2014).
23. Larson, T. & Capra, C. M. Exploiting moral wiggle room: Illusory preference
for fairness? A comment. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 4, 467–474 (2009).
24. Anderson, M. C. & Hanslmayr, S. Neural mechanisms of motivated forgetting.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 279–292 (2014).
25. Kouchaki, M. & Gino, F. Memories of unethical actions become obfuscated
over time. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 113, 6166–6171 (2016).
26. Shu, L. L. & Gino, F. Sweeping dishonesty under the rug: how unethical actions
lead to forgetting of moral rules. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 102, 1164–1177 (2012).
27. Shu, L. L., Gino, F. & Bazerman, M. H. Dishonest deed, clear conscience:
When cheating leads to moral disengagement and motivated forgetting. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Bull. 37, 330–349 (2011).
28. Stanley, M. L., Yang, B. W. & Brigard, F. D. No evidence for unethical amnesia
for imagined actions: a failed replication and extension. Mem. Cognit. https://
doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0803-y (2018).
29. Saucet, C. & Villeval, M. C. Motivated memory in dictator games. Games
Econ. Behav. 117, 250–275 (2019).
30. Rubin, D. C., Schrauf, R. W. & Greenberg, D. L. Belief and recollection of
autobiographical memories. Mem. Cogn. 31, 887–901 (2003).
31. Voss, J. L., Baym, C. L. & Paller, K. A. Accurate forced-choice recognition
without awareness of memory retrieval. Learn. Mem. 15, 454–459 (2008).
32. Bem, D. J. in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 6, p. 1–62
(Elsevier, 1972).
33. Chambers, J. R. & Windschitl, P. D. Biases in social comparative judgments:
the role of nonmotivated factors in above-average and comparative-optimism
effects. Psychol. Bull. 130, 813–838 (2004).
34. Kruger, J. Lake Wobegon be gone! The “below-average effect” and the
egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 77,
221–232 (1999).
35. Kappes, A. & Crockett, M. J. The benefits and costs of a rose-colored
hindsight. Trends Cogn. Sci. 20, 644–646 (2016).
36. Barkan, R., Ayal, S. & Ariely, D. Ethical dissonance, justifications, and moral
behavior. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 6, 157–161 (2015).
37. Tenbrunsel, A. E., Diekmann, K. A., Wade-Benzoni, K. A. & Bazerman, M. H.
The ethical mirage: a temporal explanation as to why we are not as ethical as
we think we are. Res. Organ. Behav. 30, 153–173 (2010).
38. Konow, J. Fair shares: accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation
decisions. Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 1072–1091 (2000).
39. Cooper, J. & Fazio, R. H. in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol.
17, p. 229–266 (Elsevier, 1984).
40. Gosling, P., Denizeau, M. & Oberlé, D. Denial of responsibility: a new mode of
dissonance reduction. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 90, 722–733 (2006).
41. Scher, S. J. & Cooper, J. Motivational basis of dissonance: the singular role of
behavioral consequences. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 56, 899 (1989).
42. Wicklund, R. A. & Brehm, J. W. Perspectives On Cognitive Dissonance
(Psychology Press, 1976).
43. Thibodeau, R. & Aronson, E. Taking a closer look: reasserting the role of the
self-concept in dissonance theory. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 18, 591–602 (1992).
44. Mantell, D. M. & Panzarella, R. Obedience and responsibility. Br. J. Soc. Clin.
Psychol. 15, 239–245 (1976).
45. Darwin, C. The Descent Of Man And Selection In Relation To Sex. Vol. 1
(Murray, 1888).
46. Tasimi, A. & Johnson, M. K. A self-serving bias in children’s memories?. J.
Exp. Psychol. Gen. 144, 528–533 (2015).
47. Rotella, K. N. & Richeson, J. A. Motivated to “forget” the effects of in-group
wrongdoing on memory and collective guilt. Soc. Psychol. Personal. Sci. 4,
730–737 (2013).
48. Tappin, B. M. & McKay, R. T. The illusion of moral superiority. Soc. Psychol.
Personal. Sci. 8, 623–631 (2017).
49. Gneezy, U., Kajackaite, A. & Sobel, J. Lying aversion and the size of the lie.
Am. Econ. Rev. 108, 419–453 (2018).
50. Kensinger, E. A. & Schacter, D. L. Amygdala activity is associated with the
successful encoding of item, but not source, information for positive and
negative stimuli. J. Neurosci. 26, 2564–2570 (2006).
51. McGraw, K. M. Guilt following transgression: an attribution of responsibility
approach. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 53, 247 (1987).
52. Wiwad, D. & Aknin, L. B. Motives matter: the emotional consequences of
recalled self- and other- focused prosocial acts.Motiv. Emot. 41, 730–740 (2017).
53. Robinaugh, D. J. & McNally, R. J. Autobiographical memory for shame or
guilt provoking events: Association with psychological symptoms. Behav. Res.
Ther. 48, 646–652 (2010).
54. Smith, R. H., Webster, J. M., Parrott, W. G. & Eyre, H. L. The role of public
exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 83,
138–159 (2002).
55. Di Tella, R., Perez-Truglia, R., Babino, A. & Sigman, M. Conveniently upset:
avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others’ altruism. Am. Econ. Rev.
105, 3416–3442 (2015).
56. Crowder, R. G. Principles Of Learning And Memory: Classic Edition.
(Psychology Press, 2014).
57. Amodio, D. M. Social cognition 2.0: an interactive memory systems account.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 23, 21–33 (2019).
58. Chun, M. M. & Turk-Browne, N. B. Interactions between attention and
memory. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 17, 177–184 (2007).
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-15602-4
10 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2020) 11:2100 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-15602-4 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
59. Al-Aidroos, N., Said, C. P. & Turk-Browne, N. B. Top-down attention
switches coupling between low-level and high-level areas of human visual
cortex. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 109, 14675–14680 (2012).
60. Gordon, R., Franklin, N. & Beck, J. Wishful thinking and source monitoring.
Mem. Cognit. 33, 418–429 (2005).
61. Johnson, M. K. Memory and reality. Am. Psychol. 61, 760–771 (2006).
62. Gagnepain, P., Henson, R. N. & Anderson, M. C. Suppressing unwanted
memories reduces their unconscious influence via targeted cortical inhibition.
Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 111, E1310–E1319 (2014).
63. Anderson, M. C. & Green, C. Suppressing unwanted memories by executive
control. Nature 410, 366 (2001).
64. Gruber, M. J., Ritchey, M., Wang, S.-F., Doss, M. K. & Ranganath, C. Post-
learning hippocampal dynamics promote preferential retention of rewarding
events. Neuron 89, 1110–1120 (2016).
65. Manning, J. R. et al. A neural signature of contextually mediated intentional
forgetting. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 23, 1534–1542 (2016).
66. Benoit, R. G. & Anderson, M. C. Opposing mechanisms support the voluntary
forgetting of unwanted memories. Neuron 76, 450–460 (2012).
67. Bonnici, H. M. & Maguire, E. A. Two years later–Revisiting autobiographical
memory representations in vmPFC and hippocampus. Neuropsychologia 110,
159–169 (2018).
68. Peters, E. et al. Numeracy and decision making. Psychol. Sci. 17, 407–413 (2006).
69. Atkinson, R. C. & Shiffrin, R. M. The control of short-term memory. Sci. Am.
225, 82–91 (1971).
70. Strahan, R. & Gerbasi, K. C. Short, homogeneous versions of the Marlow-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale. J. Clin. Psychol. 28, 191–193 (1972).
Acknowledgements
We thank Marcia Johnson for providing thoughtful comments on earlier versions of the
manuscript. We also thank members of the Crockett Lab—and especially Jen Siegel, Vlad
Chituc, Daniel Yudkin, Clara Colombatto, and Xanni Brown—for scientific discussions
and helpful feedback on this work.
Author contributions
R.W.C., M.A.M., E.F., and M.J.C. designed research; R.W.C., M.A.M., B.O., and M.J.C.
conducted the experiments; R.W.C. analyzed data and R.W.C., M.A.M., E.F., and M.J.C.
discussed and interpreted the data. R.W.C. wrote the paper under the supervision of
M.J.C.—with critical input from M.A.M. and E.F.
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Additional information
Supplementary information is available for this paper at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-
020-15602-4.
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to R.W.C. or M.J.C.
Peer review information Nature Communications thanks Roy F. Baumeister and the
other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work. Peer
reviewer reports are available.
Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.nature.com/reprints
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party
material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless
indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the
article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
© The Author(s) 2020
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-15602-4 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2020) 11:2100 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-15602-4 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications 11
